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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the role of union wage contracts in the persistence
of inflation, and the implication of these contracts for the problem of dis-
inflation in the United States. A quantitative model of overlapping con-
tracts explicitly oriented toward the major union sector is developed. The
model takes account of expectations of future wage, price, and employment
conditions as in more aggregated models that have been used in macro-
economic research. In addition, the distribution of workers according
to contract length as well as deferred wage increases and escalator clauses
are explicitly used in the model. The main aim of the model is to determine
the constraints which these contracts impose on disinflation paths. The
model indicates that the maximum speed of disinflation is extremely slow
inthe early phases——if a rise in unemployment is to be avoided——but
increases considerably before the new lower rate of inflation is reached.
Thedisinflation path is considerably slower than that observed after
hyperinflarion periods. However, the existence of a path of inflation
reduction raises questions about whether the institution of union wage con-
tracts is really the direct cause of costly disinflations, or whether
their influence works indirectly by raising credibility problems about
a monetary disinflation.
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The three—year union labor contract has been singled out by many econo-
mists as a major factor underlying the persistence of wage inflation in the
United States, and as a reason for the resistance of inflation to aggregate
demand policy. Set throughout a three—year cycle of decentralized collec-
tive bargaining settlements, these overlapping contracts have also been
cited as the primary institutional difference between U. S. wage deterrnina—
tion and that of other countries, such as Germany and Japan, where nominal
wage inflation has appeared to be less persistent.'Such differences
have even led to proposals for shortening the terms of U. S. labor union
contracts and centralizing contract settlements in order to reduce the per-
sistence of inflation.
The basic rationale for assigning a major role in the inflation process
to the institution of three—year union contracts follows closely from ar-
guments developed in the labor economics literature, and in particular, the
early ttpat tern bargaining1' literature of Ross (1948) and Dunlop (1957).
One union sets a pattern wage increase and other unions who follow in the
bargaining cycle imitate with a similar wage increase. For example, in
This research was supported by a grant from the National Science Founda-
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and assistance, and to Olivier Blanchard, Alan Blinder, and Bennett
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makinga case for centralization reforms, Lester Thurow has recently
2/
argued :—
Americanwages are now set in a context of overlapping
three—year indexed contracts. In such a system it be-
comes very difficult to phase down wage gains unless an
industry is on the brink of extinction. Suppose that this
year the Machinistst union is negotiating a new three—year
contract. Last year the Auto Workers negotiated a three—
year contract for 10% rise per year. In many plants
machinists work right next to auto workers. No leader
of the machinists can settle for less than 10% per year
and still remain in office. And in two years' time the auto
leaders will be similarly imprisoned by what the machinists
negotiate today. ...Allcontracts should run the same length of
time, so that the country could negotiate in simultaneous
national wage negotiations.
Recently, formal, though highly aggregated, models of overlapping wage
setting have appeared in the macroeconomic literature. These models are
somewhat different from the earlier explanations of wage persistence in
thatexplicit theories of endogenous inflationary expectations have been
incorporated into the wage contracting process (see Taylor (1980), for
example).The results have indicated that the persistence of inflation
generated by overlapping contracts is considerably different and poten-
tially much less resistant to changes in macroeconomic policy than earlier
studies have indicated. To date, however, these aggregate models have not
incorporated any explicit characteristics of long—term union contracts in
the U. S.——the actual lengths of contracts, the number of workers nego-
tiating at different dates throughout the year, the deferred wage increases,
and the escalator clauses. Although the models have been formulated in
enough detail for aggregate econometric work, institutional details (such
as the distribution of workers by contract length) have been treated as
parameters to be estimated. Hence, these models have not been able to
address explicit issues involving wage settlements in the union sector.—3—
The purpose of this paper is to examine some of these issues by de—
veloping and simulating a model of overlapping contracts explicitly
oriented toward the major union sector in the United States, but which
takes account of expectations as in the more aggregated models in the macro
literature. Using data on union wage settlements, we calculate the dis-
tribution of workers by contract length and take account of the deferred
wage increases and the escalator clauses which have come to be important
features of many long—term contracts. The main aim in developing such a
model is to determine the constraints which the long—term overlapping
contracts put on attempts to reduce the rate of inflation, or to break the
momentum of inflation. The most effective way to characterize these
constraints is to calculate the maximum speed of disinflation which can
occur without a rise in unemployment and without wage concessions in
existing contracts. The model indicates that the maximum speed may be
extremely slow in the early phases of disinflation——almost imperceptable
in the first few quarters——followed by a period of greater deceleration
of wages until the new lower rate of inflation is reached.'Such a
disinflation path is considerably different than the instantaneous drop to
low inflation rates observed by Sargent (1980) in his study of the end of
the hyperinflations in the 1920's. However, the existence of a path of
inflation reduction along which the increase in unemployment is minimal,
despite the long—term contracts, raises questions about whether the in-
stitution of overlapping union wage—setting is really the central diff i—
culty in reducing inflation without real costs, and whether centralization
reforms would be of much value.' The model indicates that a gradual
reduction in the growth of aggregate demand is necessary to reduce infla——4—
tion without great costs in an economy with long—term contracts. The
difficulty with such a path is that it may raise doubts in the early stages
about whether a lower inflation rate will ever be reached. Potentially,
the information provided by the model may be of some value to policymakers
in planning and communicating a monetary disinflation, as well as to in-
dividual wage negotiators deciding what to do during such a disinflation.
It may even help in improving the accuracy of inflation forecasting.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 1 we describe the
central features of overlapping wage contracts in the major union sector
of the U. S. In Section 2 we examine the problem of determining an
appropriate level of disaggregation for modeling purposes and introduce
notation and assumptions used in the model. In section 3 we describe the
behavioral equations of the model, and in section 4 we report the results
of calculations and simulations of a disinflation from 10 percent to 3
percent wage inflation.
L Characteristics of Long—Term Union Wage Contracting in the U. S.
In May 1981 the United Mine Workers signed a contract with the Bitumi-
nous Coal Operators which is typical of the kind of wage adjustment found
in the major union sector in recent years of relatively high inflation.
Affecting about 160,000 workers, the contract called for wage increases
over a set period of 40 months through September 1984. The wage increases
would average 11% per year, starting with an immediate adjustment of $1.20
and followed by deferred increases of $1.10 and $1.00 in the second and
third years and $.30 in the last quarter. Clearly these deferred increases
reflect high expected inflation rates on the part of both the firms and
workers, but the contract involves no escalation clause. In this later—5--
respect,it is similar to about 45% of all major union contracts. The
approximately 10% wage adjustments in the second and third year will occur
according to schedule, unless the contract is reopened and concessions are
made, an event which generally occurs only when the industry or certain
firmsreachdistressed conditions.
The coal contract is one of the major union contracts (defined as af-
fecting1000 or more workers) about which this type detailed information on
wage adjustment is avai1able' in the U. S. Approximately 10 million workers
areinvolved in these major union contracts, or about one—half of all union-
ized workers who currently constitute about 20 percent of the labor force
in the Ti. S. The model developed below will focus on the workers in this
major union sector for which such data are available. Although this sec-
tor accounts for only 10 percent of the U. S. labor force, there are good
reasons to study this group of workers, even were it not for this data
1imitation.-' The vastmajority of three—year labor contracts are accounted
for by this group of workers, and it is this group which has received most
of the attention in current discussions about the international differences
in wage setting institutions. Although the evidence is mixed about whether
these unions influence wage setting in the small union or the non—union
sector, or the reverse,1 it is clear that close attention is paid to these
contracts in policy discussions. Furthermore, once an adequate description
of wage determination in these unions is developed, it would be possible
to extend the framework to include the other wage setting sectors, though
we would have to rely on indirect estimation of the form of contracts in
those sectors. In any case, in what follows we will take the major union
sector as the universe of workers in our analysis and base our calculations—6—
of aggregate wage change and inflation on this sector.
Table 1 suarizes the pattern of bargaining activity in this major
unionsector during the 1970's.Not all workers in this group are under
three—yearcontracts, but a significant fraction are. The three—year cycle
in the longer—term contracts is evident in Table 1, with 1979 and 1980 be-
ing heavy years in termsofcol1ectie bargaining and 1981 being light,
and with the three—year pattern continuing on a regular basis. Moreover,
there is an obvious seasonal pattern with most bargaining activity taking
place in the second and third quarters. There is some gradual shiftingof
these patterns caused either by delays in reaching a settlement or by early
settlements. These shifts will move a group of workers out of its cycle,
at least temporarily. Some of the shifting is also caused by deviations
from the exact 1, 2, and 3 year durations.
Table 2 summarizes the quarterly pattern of negotiated wage increases
for the workers' in the major unionsector.Clearly a s-ignificant fraction
of any wageadjustmentoccurs in the later years of long—term contracts,
but there is some front—end loading with the current settlements a bit larger
than the deferred increases. Moreover, any cyclical sensitivity of wage
adjustment appears to occur mainlyinthe short—term contracts or in the
first year of the long—term contracts. The deferred wage increases show
almost no cyclical sensitivity.
In interpreting these deferred wage increases itis important to take
account of the degree of escalation in these contracts.The data reported
in Tables 1 and 2 relate to both indexed andnon—indexed contracts, About
55 percent of the workers in this major union sectorhave some type of—7—
escalation clause inthircontracts, though it is usually less than full
indexation to price changes. There is an obvious tradeoff between the size
of the set deferred increase and the amount of indexing for any given ex-
pected rate of inflation. This is seen in Table 3 where a comparison of
first year and length—of—contract wage adjustments is given for contracts
with escalators and those without. Clearly the increased dispersion between
the deferred increases in indexed and non—indexed contracts in the late
1970's reflects an increase in inflationary expectations (there has been only
a slight increase in indexation over this period). As workers and firms
expect the escalator clause to take up a large part of future wage in-
creases, the deferred increases are correspondingly reduced. This substi-
tution is built into the model described below and should indicate that the
relatively modest deferred increases reported in the late 1970's in Table 2
are at least partially due to the indexation clauses in many of these
contracts.
It should also be noted that Table 2 does not include fringe benefits.
For a smaller group of workers (settlements involving 5000 or more workers),
similar data are available on total compensation adjustments though these
data are not available by contract length or by annual deferred increases.
Table 4 reports a comparison of wage versus compensation adjustments which
indicates that the discrepancies between the two are of some potential
significance.
In any given quarterly time period the aggregate wage change for the
group of workers in the major union sector can be divided into the current
settlement component determined in the current quarter, and the prior
settlement component determined by previous deferred wage increases, plus—8—
anadjustment for indexation, the escalator component. The sumofthese
gives the total effective wage change for this sector and corresponds
closelytoother measures of aggregate compensation in the United States.
2. Aggregation Issues.
An important consideration in designing a model of wage contracting
is the appropriate level of aggregation. Some wage disaggregation is neces-
sary because of the differences in the contracts signed at different dates.
At any point in time the aggregate wage is composed of contract wages set
by workers at different times in the past, and hence with different informa-
tion sets and with different remaining durations. Aggregating across such
contracts could miss crucial features of the dynamics of inflation.
While it is possible to model each of the 5000 settlements in the
major union group separately, as the BLS data file has information on every
settlement, for computational reasons we chose to aggregate these settlements
into 24 groups of workers and to focus on the average wage change for con-
tracts negotiated in each quarter. Contracts are first grouped into three
classes corresponding to their length: 6 months through 18 months, 19 months
through 30 months, and 31 months and over. These correspond to the 1, 2,
and 3 year grouping of contracts shown in Table 1. The 24 groups, or cohorts,
of workers then correspond to the 4 groups of workers signing one—year
contracts every 4 quarters, the 8 groups of workers signing two—year contracts
every 8 quarters, and the 12 groups of workers signing three—year contracts
every 12 quarters.
The relative importance of each of these 24 groups in the wage setting
process can be obtained directly from the data on the number of workers by
contract length reported in Table 1.—9—
Asmentioned above, however, the distribution of workers by
contract length drifts gradually over time; that is, the one, two, and
three year cycles do not exactly repeat themselves every one, two, or
three years. Hence, the composition of each of these 24 groups of
workers gradually changes over time. For the purpose of illustrating
the general properties of the model, this drift can be ignored. We
use the most recent contract data reported in Table 1 and assume that
this distribution repeats every one, two or three years depending
on the length of the contracts.2-' This distribution, organized into
the 24 contract cohorts, is showninTable 5, along with the year of
observation upon which the distribution is based. As an aid in
keeping track of the cohort groups we have given a representative
industry bargaining name to eachcohort,which is also shown in Table
5.
Inany given quarter, three of these groups will be negotiating
wage changes: one of the one—year contract groups, one of the two—
year, and one of the three—year contract groups. We assume that all
wage changes occur at thestart,and at yearly intervals after the
start, of each contract. Hence, the one—year contract group must
determine a single wage level for the year. The two—year contract
group must determine two wage levels: one for the first year, and one
for the second year. The three—year contract group must determine
three wage levels: one for each of the three years. The wage change
for the first year of these contracts corresponds to the current set-
tlement and the wage changes for the second and third year correspond
to deferred settlements in Table2.-u-'— 10—
Inorder to summarize these assumptions and describe the behavioral
relationships which underlie the model, some notation will be helpful.
Let
n.(t) =numberof workers signing contracts of length
jTh quarter t.
x.(t,s)log of the wage set in contracts of length j
th signed in quarter t to prevail in the s
quarter following quarter t.
The aggregation assumption is that j equals either 4, 8, or 12, corres-
ponding to the one, two, and three—year contracts. The assumption that
wage changes occur only at yearly intervals is represented algebraically
as
(1) x(t,s) =x,(t,0)for s=1,2,3 and j4, 8, l2
(2) xjt,4+s) =x.(t,4),s =1,2,3and j8, 12
(3) x12(t,8+s) =x12(t,8),
sl,2,3
Equation (1) states that the wage level is constant during the first
year of the one, two, and three—year contracts (j =4,8, and 12), and
equal to the value determined in the first quarter x.(t,0)., Equation
(2) states that the wage level is constant during the second year of the
two and three—year contracts (j =8and 12), and equal to the value set
in the first quarter of the second year x,(t,4). Finally, equation
(3) states that the wage level is unchanged during the third year of— 11—
threeyear contracts (jl2).
During each quarter six wage levels are determined; three
current levels: x4(t,O), x8(t,O), and x12(t,0); and three deferred
levels: x8(t,4), x12(t,4) and x12(t,8). Note that there is no
presumption that the deferred wage levels are equal to the current
levelsso that deferred increases are possible according to this set-
up.
The aggregate wage is a weighted average of the contract wages






Our use of logarithms means that (4) should be interpreted as the log
of a geometrically weighted index of contract wages.
3. Wage Setting Assumptions.
The wage determination process is analogous to that used in the
theoretical staggered contract model described in Taylor (1980), In
particular we assume that, in the absence of a need for a change in
relative wages, it is natural for workers and firmstoattempt to keep
their ownwagesas close as possible to the prevailing level of wages
during the period of the contract, adjusted for skill and other dif-
ferentials. If wage adjustments are thought to be necessary, because
of a shift in labor market demand or supply conditions, then these
adjustments will be made relative to this prevailing wage. Since we— 12—
areinterested in how union contracts should be adjusted during a
general disinflation period, where there is no explicit need for rela-
tive wage change, we will focus on a behavioral assumption which
maintains the relative wage structure.
Consider first the case of non—indexed contracts We assume that
one—year contracts will call for a wage adjustment to equal the average
wage expected to prevail during the contract periodS Similarly, the
first year of 2 and 3—year contracts will have a wage adjustment to
equal the prevailing wage during that same one—year period. Alge-
braically the current settlements are then given by:
3,'
(5) x.(t,O) = w(t+s) j4,8, 12,
s=O
where w(t) is the expectation ofw(t) the average wage defined in
equation (4). For the deferred wage increases in the second year of
two and three—year contracts, we assume
7,'
(6) x.(t,4) E w(t+s) j8,12
s4
and finally, for the deferred increase in the third year of three—year
contracts,
11
(7) x12(t,8) E w(t+s)
s= 8
Most theories of wage adjustment suggest that labor market conditions— 13—
willinfluence wages and in particular that wages will be bidup
relative to the prevailing wage during periods when the unemployment
rate is low, and conversely when the unemployment rate is high. This,
for example, is the explicit assumption used in Taylor (1980). It
would be appropriate, therefore, to add a negative function of the
unemployment rate (measured relative to the natural or normal level of
unemployment) tc'theright—hand side of equations (5) through (7).
The fact that no additional terms are added, so that equations (5)
through (7) hold at all times, is simply a way to ensure that full em—
ployment is maintained. As stated in the introduction, this is a con-
venient way to characterize how wage contracts constrain the movements
of aggregate wages. Of course, it would be possible to modify the
model by adding unemployment effects to the right—hand side of equations
(5) through (7) in order to examine how much unemployment might rise
if disinflation occurs too quickly.
The behavioral equations reflect a relative wage concern on thepart
of workers. It is possible to interpret these equations in terms of the
wage imitation literature: each union imitates the behavior of other
unions by establishing wages which meet the going wage. Note, however,
that (skill adjusted) wage levels, not rates of change, are what are
imitated. Moreover, in terms of pattern bargaining terminology, the
pattern must run in both directions. Because the aggregate wage w(t)
is comprised of past wage decisions (see equation (4)), each ofequa-
tions (5) through (7) indicate that current wage decisions are "patterned"
on previous wage decisions. But since the future contract decisions
are also embedded in the future average wages, current wage decisions— 14—
arealso patterned on future wage decisions. The traditional pattern
bargaining literature focused entirely on the former type of pattern-
ing. The behavioral equations used here are forward—looking, although
the staggering of contracts naturally leads to backward—looking. These
features have been emphasized in the recent theoretical overlapping
contract literature.--'
When contracts are indexed, the contracted adjustment in wages will
reflect the expected increase or decrease in wage rates which will
arise because of changes in the price level. Consider the following
example. In a steady inflation of 10 percent, the above contracting
arrangements would imply that a three—year contract without indexing
would have a 10 percent increase in the first year, followed by a 10
percent increase in each of the second two years (10, 10, 10).
Suppose, instead, that contracts are indexed at .3 in the second and
third year, so that a 10 percent increase in the price level automat-
ically adds 3 percent to the wage in the second and third year. Then
in a steady 10 percent inflation where prices and wages are increasing
at the same rate, the set wage increase would again be 10 percent in
the first year, but only 7 percent in the second and third years (10,
7, 7). The remaining increase in wages of 3 percent in the second and
third years would come from indexing; that is, (10, 7, 7) + (0, 3, 3) =
(10,10, 10).
These effects are incorporated into the model by adjusting down
the set wage in equations (6) and (7) by the amount of increase which
is ed from indexing. The exact size of the indexing is assumed
to be constant fraction of the increase in the aggregate price level— 15—
duringthe previous four quarters. This constant is the same for
12/ all workers.— We assume, as in the example, that indexing reviews
occur annually at the start of the second and third year of two
and three—year contracts. One—year contracts are not indexed. In
the calculations reported in this paper, the real wage is assumed to
be constant so that the indexing is assumed to be a fixed fraction
of the increase in the aggregate wage.
4. Solving the Model.
We will use the rational expectations assumption for generating
the forecasts of future expected wages. To do this we must close
the model. The easiest way to do this is to assume a simple quantity.
type relation for the demand for money. In particular, we assume
that deviations of real GNP from trend are proportional to deviations
of real money balances from trend. Our assumption of full employment
used in these solutions corresponds to holding real GNP at a trend
(full—employment) level, or equivalently to holding real money balances
at a trend (full—employment) level. If real wages are constant,
then we simply require that real balances measured in wage units do
not deviate from a level consistent with full employment, Let m(t)
be the log of money, which is assumed to be exogenous. The model is
closed by requiring that
(8) m(t) —w(t)=k
where k is the full—employment level of real balances.
We will only simulate the model for paths for which (8) is satis-
fied. The qualitative behavior of the economy when (8) is not satisfied— 16—
isfairly clear, however. If m(t) —w(t)>kthen unemployment
will fall below normal levels, because higher real balances will
reduce interest rates and stimulate demand. Similarly, if
m(t) -w(t)<k,then unemployment will rise above normal. In
the first situation, the low unemployment will tend to bid up new
wage settlements relative to the prevailing level, because a positive
term would appear on the right—hand side of (5) through (7). In the
second situation, wage settlements will be bid down,
The model, consisting entirely of equations (1) through (8), is
a linear (in the logarithms) rational expectations model. At each date,
6 wage levels are determined and these depend on wage decisions made
as far as 11 quarters in the past and an wage decisions to be made
as far as 11 quarters in the future. The model has flaccelerationistu
properties in that any steady state money growth path, and corres-
ponding wage inflation path satisfies the equations of the model,
and is therefore consistent with full employment. In this paper,
however, we are interested in disinflation——moving from a high rate
of inflation to a low rate of inflation——without deviating from full em-
ployment. To calculate such disinflation paths, the model was solved
using the EP algorithm discussed by Fair and Taylor (1982). In all
cases we found that there was only one full—employment disinflation
path for a given parameter configuration of themode1)-" The proper-
ties of this path are described in the next section.
4. Patterns of Wage Settlements during a Disinflation.
Consider a situation where the rate of wage inflation has been
steady for a long period of time at 10 percent per year and where there—17—
is no indexing of contracts. Then, according to the equations of
the model, the current wage adjustment and deferred wage adjustments
in the long—term contracts would all be equal to 10 percent per year.
For example, every three years the Coal Niners would sign a contract
calling for 10 percent wage increase in each of the three years of
their long—term contract, much as in the actual 1981 agreement dis—
cussed above. After the signing of such agreements there would be a
considerable overhang of deferred pay increases in future years. It
is this overhang which makes it necessary for wage adjustments in
other contracts to be gradual if subsequent to the coal settlement
a general disinflation begins.
Suppose that, in the first quarter of a heavy bargaining year
(e.g., the Tobacco contract cohort), a general disinflation from 10
percent to 3 percent begins and is thereafter expected to continue.
The important policy issue about how such a disinflation is engineered
through aggregate demand policy depends greatly on how union wage
settlements might develop. Table 6 shows the settlement pattern which
is consistent with the equations of the model and therefore with full
employment. The first six columns of Table 6 show the contract wage
settlements in percentage terms. These are simply the changes in
the (logs of the) levels of the wages determined as explained above.
The column labeled "1 Year Contracts" shows the current settlement for
workers signing one—year contracts in that quarter; that is,
x4(t,0) —x4(t—4,0).Similarly the column labeled "1st Year" in the
2—year and 3—year contracts shows the percentage change in the cur-
rent settlement for those cohorts. The columns labeled "2nd Year"— 18—
and"3rd Year" show the deferred increase in the longer term contracts.
The effective wage change is simply the first difference of the log
of the aggregate wage w(t) from quarter to quarter (w(t) —w(t—1)).
Because of the seasonal pattern of workers negotiating each quarter,
it is more informative to look at the change of w(t) over four
quarters which is shown in the effective wage change column labeled
"Year."
The simulation begins in quarter 1 of year L Previous to this
first quarter the entries in Table 7 would have been 10 percent in all
columns with the exception of the quarterly effective wage change which
14 / fluctuatesseasonally.—
What is most striking about Table 6 is the gradual decline in
the inflation rate, especially in the early periods of the disinfla-
tion. The effective wage change decline is barely noticeable for a full
year. The decline is about one percentage point in the second year,
a large five percentage points in the third year, and about one more
percentage point in the fourth year. It is only after the new nego-
tiations are well beyond the overhang of past deferred wage increases
that noticeable declines in the inflation rate occur. Note, however,
that in the long—term contracts there is a definite sign that disin-
flation is underway: the third year deferred increases in the 3—year
contracts are down substantially relative to the previous settlement.
The third—year deferred increase in the settlement negotiated in quarter
2 is about half the previous third—year deferred increase.
Table 7 shows the results of a similar disinflation in the case
where the contracts are indexed according to the assumptions of the—19—
model. It is assumed that on average, contracts have 30 percent
escalation. As one would expect, the actual effective wage change
occurs less gradually in this case as the indexing formulas permit
some change in the wage levels determined in previous contracts.
However, the difference is very small. Recall that there is no in-
dexing in the first year and that indexing reviews only occur annually.
Alternative assumptions might make a greater difference.
It is useful to compare these results with the predictions of
other models of wage and price dynamics. The rate of disinflation
is considerably slower than what is implied by rational expectations
models with perfectly flexible prices. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, Sargent's (1980) finding that a quick disinflation occurred
without significant real costs after the central European hyper
inflation would not be expected in an economy with sticky prices or
wages. The simulations of this model indicate in quantitative terms
howlarge the difference in speed might be if the U. S. union wage con-
tracting is the source of stickiness. On the other hand, the speed of
disinflation is faster than what is implied by conventional expecta-
tions—augmented Phillips curve models which imply that the rate
of inflation cannot be reduced at all by aggregate demand policy without
an increase in unemployment. These models predict that inflation
would remain at 10 percent if unemployment doesn't rise above the natural
rate.
5. Concluding Remarks.
The simulations presented in this paper have focused on a possible
scenario for union wage settlements during a disinflation in the— 20—
contextof three—year.contracts. Although the scenario shows that
it is possible in principle for such a disinflation to occur without
any increase in unemployment, the path of the adjustments which we
have calculated shows extremely gradual changes in the first two
years of a disinflation program.
Under the assumption of a fairly stable relationship between
money and nominal GNP, this implies a very gradual deceleration of
money growth during the early stages of disinflation. The shape of
the overhang of previously negotiated deferred wage increases implies
that a gradual reduction in money growth would permit the economy to
get past this overhang before starting the more rapid part of the
disinflation prograza)1 The difficulty with this in practice is
that wage negotiators have to be convinced that the deceleration will
come later even though it is not occurring today. (The last column
in Tables 6 and 7 have to be rational forecasts.) This credibility
problem is perhaps the central source of difficulty which is raised by
long—term union contracts during a period of disinflation. At the
heart of this credibility problem is a time—inconsistency problem
thattakes a particularly explicit form in this model of union wage
settlements: ifpolicymakersfind itoptimalto ratify the over-
hang ofpast deferred wage increases in the hope that negotiators will
begin to adjust their wage demands in the future, they will also
find it optimal to ratify the deferred wage increases in the future
if these adjustments do not take place.— 21—
FOOTNOTES
1. Sachs (1979) has tabulated the different institutional arrange-
ments for wage determination in the U. S. and several other
countries. Branson and Rotemberg (1980), and Gordon (1982)
have presented econometric estimates which suggest that
aggregate wage inflation has more inertia in the U. S.
2. "Thurow's Third Way,'t The Economist, 23—29, January 1982,
p. 32. Bosworth (1981) has also recommended similar changes in
U. S. collective bargaining.
3. A recent critical analysis of the pattern bargaining hypothesis
is reported in Mitchell (1980), pp. 163—207.
4. As is described in more detail below, the disinflation similations
are made as if the major union sector constituted the entire
U. S. labor force. Since long—term contracts are more prevalent
in the major union sector, the results are likely to be biased
toward slow adjustment, and a useful extension of the model would
be to consider an adjustment for such bias.
5. Such a path also exists for the more elementary models of
wage contracts and has been explored by Phelps (1979).
6. The data is kept on file at the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Summaries and cross tabulations are reported in various issues
of Current Wage Developments.
7. It should be emphasized, however, that this group may not be
representative of workers in the U. S. where one—year implicit— 22—
contractsseem to dominate most wage setting situations.
8.For a recent empirical investigation see Flanagan (1976).
9. For forecasting purposes, it might be useful to incorporate
the actual distribution during the forecasting period.
10. Although the data in Table 2 was used only as a general guide
in designing the model, as a rough check on the adequacy of this
aggregation procedure, we compared the behavior of the effective
ge change as estimated using these aggregation assumptions
and the data in Table 2 with the actual effective wage change
compiledby BLS using the full file on individual union settle
ments. Although there were some discrepancies, our estimated
series matched the major movements in the actual series. Pre-
liminarywork with anaggregation scheme which does not dis
tinguishbetween contracts of different length (i.e., an aggregate
of all settlements in a given quarter) and which lumped all de-
ferred increases into a single change over—thelife" of the
contract, did not prove successful in generating a reasonable
effective wage change series. Hence, it appears that a level of
disaggregation at least as fine as that chosen here is necessary
to achieve a satisfactory degree of accuracy.
11. Note that wages are set to equal the prevailing wage ex ante
in equations (5) through (7), Surprise movements in other
workers' wages may disrupt this goal, so that ex post there may
be relative wage gains or losses. An unsettled issue is whether
workers might try to "overtake" rather than just "catch—up" to
other workers in order to make up these losses; such "overtaking"— 23—
isruled out bythebehavioral assumptions in this model.
12. Rather than assume that a fraction of workers have indexed
contracts, we assume that all workers are indexed though at
a lower rate. For example, if 50 percent of the workers have
contracts indexed at .6, then this is treated in the model as
if 100 percent of the workers have contracts indexed at .3.
13. This corresponds to Phelps (1969) result for the elementary
staggered contracts model. The details of the solution procedure
are as follows. We added m(t) —w(t)k to the right—hand
side of equations (5) through (7) and solved the model for a
given m(t) path. We then summed up the squared differences
[m(t) —w(t)—k]2over the solution period, and search over
m(t) paths using the DFP algorithm to minimize the sum of squares.
The minimum value was always zero. Clearly when m(t) —w(t)—k=0,
full employment conditions hold.
13. Specifically we assume that this begins at the negotiation time
for the first cohort of those signing one—year contracts, for the
fifth cohort of those signing two—year contracts, and the first
cohort of those signing three—year contracts. See Table 5.
14. The entries in this last column were fluctuating seasonally accord-
ing to the steady quarterly pattern 1.06, 2.66, 3,95, 2.33,
before the disinflation began.
15. Phelps (1980) has considered these issues in the context of
theoretical models of wage contracting.— 24—
Table 1
Numberof Woriers in Major Union Settlements
by Contract Lenth,197:1—198O:
(Thousanc)
1yea: 2 year 3 year
Contracts Contracts Contracts Total
1974:1 116 114 263 493
2 379 373 850 1602
3 233 269 1477 1979
4 157 177 692 1026
1975:1 67 86 395 548
2 172 326 264 762
3 325 215 529 1069
4 77 84 231 553
1976:1 29 67 158 254
2 109 259 1044 1412
3 163 159 673 995
4 82 78 1104 1264
1977:1 43 98 226 367
2 215 138 950 1303
3 125 121 1325 1571
4 52 60 400 512
1978:1 19 29 338 386
2 104 195 380 679
3 70 238 599 907
4 58 97 378 533
1979 :1 45 31 186 262
2 107 164 836 1107
3 39 49 1166 1254
4 29 135 667 831
1980:1 10 60 299 369
2 80 167 693 940
3 99 203 1325 1627
4 25 177 652 854
Notes: Major Settlements are those involving 1000 or moreworkers.
Contract Length is rounded to nearest year.
Source: Current Wage Developments.Cumulative totals are published
quarterly for each year.; the numbers in the table are obtainedfrom these
cumulative totals.— 25—
Table2
Current and Deferred ae Chan2e n Maor Union
Set:ienentsby ContractLength. 197:l—l980:3
I year Contracts 2 year Contracts 3 fear Contracts
Source: Current WageDevelornents
1st year2nd veer 1st year2nd veer3rd veer
1974:1 7.3 6.7 7.3 7.2 5.9 5.2
2 9.4 8.7 6.5 9,3 5.2 3.8
3 10.5 10.4 5.9 10.7 5.0 4.5
4 12.2 11.1 6.9 9.9 5.7 4.8
1975:1 6.8 13.8 9.6 13.2 4.0 4,0
2 6.5 10.9 8.5 11.0 6.0 4.3
3 7.8 8.9 6.7 10.7 5.9 5.5
4 7.3 10.6 7.2 9.8 5.3 4.8 .
1976:1 6,2 8.0 6.9 9.3 8.1 6.1
2 5.8 7.0 5.3 9.0 6.1 5.6
3 5.5 8.7 6.5 10.7 6.7 5.4
4 6.2 7.0 5.2 7.2 4.1 2.8
1977:1 3.4 9.2 8.5 7,7 5.6 5.0
2 5.6 7.5 5.8 8.8 5.1 4.5
3 6.1 7.0 6.3 7.8 4.3 1,7
4 3.8 9.2 6.7 8.2 5.4 3.9
1978:1 6.4 5.5 4.6 10.6 6.4 4.9
2 5.2 7.7 7.1 6.8 5.5 2.7
3 6.5 7.4 6.0 7.5 5.7 3.9
4 6.2 8.0 5.8 7.2 5.4 4.2
1979:1 8.2 8.8 5.4 3.3 9.5 3.9
2 8.2 9.0 6.9 9.2 6.0 4.0
3 7.7 8.0 12.2 6.6 4.0 3.4
4 7.3 9.4 7.5 6.4 4.8 6.2
1980:1 10.1 10.7 9.9 6.7 4.6 4.7
2 10.9 11.8 8.8 7.7 4.7 4.4
3 13.5 10.7 9.3 10.5 5.6 4.9— 26—
Table3
Contract Settlements With or Without Escalator Clauses
1977197819791980*
First Year Adjustment 7.8 7.6 7.4 9.1
Contracts with Escalator 8.0 7.1 6.2 7.4
Contracts without Escalator 7,6 8.0 9.111.6
Adjustment Over Life of Contract 5.8 6.4 6.0 6.8
Contracts with Escalator 5.0 5.3 4.6 4,7
Contracts without Escalator 6.9 7.1 8.0 9,2
Source: Current Wage Developments
Table 4
Contract Settlements With and without Fringe Benefits
Wage Change in Compensation Change
Settlements With in Settlements With
1000 or More Workers 5000 or More Workers
1978 1979 1978 1979
First Year Adjustment 7.6 7.48.3 9.0
Average Over Life of
Contract 6.4 6.06.3 6.6
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